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TRADEMARK LAW REVISION AcT OF 1988 AND THE
GATEKEEPER ROLE OF THE PTO: HEADING ABUSE
OFF AT THE PASS
"No trade-no trademark" has long been the underlying principle of
American trademark law.1 Until recently, the Lanham Act2 embodied
this maxim by requiring use of a mark prior to federal registration.3
Congress ushered in a new era in trademark registration, however, with
the passage of the Trademark Law Revision Act of 19881 (1988 Act).
Hailed as the most significant change in trademark law in forty years,5
the 1988 Act includes provisions which for the first time allow domestic
applicants to seek registration of a trademark prior to use.6
The 1988 Act essentially creates a dual application system: for marks7
already used in commerce, the "use in commerce" registration system is
preserved;' for proposed marks, registration includes filing a notice of
"intent to use." 9 The intent-to-use legislation has three primary goals:1°
1. See McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245 (1877). Modern courts continue to articulate this
principle. See, eg., United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90 (1981).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1982), also known as the Trademark Act of 1946.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1982). This Note discusses the use requirement with respect to registra-
tion on the Principal Register. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1090-1096 govern registration on the Supplemental
Register, which does not confer the substantive rights obtained through registration on the Principal
Register.
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1128 (1988). On November 16, 1988, President Reagan signed into law
Public Law 100-667, effective November 16, 1989. President Signs Trademark Bill with Satellite
Television Provisions, 37 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 87 (Nov. 24, 1988) [hereinafter
President Signs Trademark Bill].
5. See Trademark Law Change is Taking Effect, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 1989, at Bl 1, col. 1
(hereinafter Trademark Law Change); 134 CONG. REc. S16,972 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1988) (statement
of Sen. DeConcini).
6. 134 CONG. REc. 11,073 (1988) (statement of Sen. DeConcini). Other major revisions of the
1988 Act include: a provision reducing the federal registration and renewal period from twenty
years to ten, 15 U.S.C. § 1058(a); a provision giving plaintiffs in infringement cases for unregistered
marks the same relief measures available to holders of registered marks, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1116-1118; and
a provision creating a cause of action for trade disparagement in the form of false advertising, 15
U.S.C. § 1125(a).
7. The Lanham Act makes a distinction between the terms "trademark" and "mark." See 15
U.S.C. § 1127. However, this Note uses the terms interchangeably.
8. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a) (1988). See infra notes 25-35 and accompanying text.
9. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b) (1988). See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
10. S. REP. No. 515, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5577, 5577 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 515]:
The purpose of the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988 is to bring the trademark law up-
to-date with present day business practices, to increase the value of the federal trademark
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1) to lessen the risks inherent in developing a trademark in a modem
economy; 2) to eliminate "token use," a legal fiction developed to facili-
tate compliance with the preapplication use requirement of the Lanham
Act; 2 and 3) to reconcile American trademark law with trademark regis-
tration laws of other countries. 13
While the 1988 Act enjoys wide ranging support, 4 the new law raises
some problems. Critics argue that the intent-to-use provisions of the
1988 Act will overload the system with unused marks." They also assert
that certain provisions relating to notice of intent to use are too vague,
and therefore registrants may use registration unfairly to deprive compet-
itors of the opportunity to establish marks. 6 This Note examines the
intent-to-use provisions of the Trademark Law Revision Act and ad-
dresses the validity of the critics' charges. Part I reviews the state of the
law before enactment of the 1988 Act and the circumstances giving rise
registration system for U.S. companies, to remove the current preference for foreign com-
panies applying to register trademarks in the United States and to improve the law's pro-
tection of the public from counterfeiting, confusion, and deception.
Id. Accord, 134 CONG. REC. 11,073 (1988) (statement of Sen. DeConcini); 134 CONG. REc. S16,972
(daily ed. Oct. 20, 1988) (statement of Sen. DeConcini)
11. See infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 41-56 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 57-86 and accompanying text.
14. 134 CONG. REc. H10,423 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1988) (supporters of the Trademark Law
Revision Act of 1988 include representatives from industry, trade and labor organizations, bar as-
sociations, private attorneys and law firms, the U.S. Department of Commerce, and the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office).
15. House Panel Hears Views on Trademark Act Revision, 36 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT
J. (BNA) 489, 490 (Sept. 15, 1988) (statements of Roberta Jacobs Meadway) [hereinafter House
Panel Hears Views] (businesses would have to search through many marks before finding one that
appears clear); Trademark Bill Snags, ADVERTISING AGE, April 18, 1988, at 20 (letter to the editor
from Roberta Jacobs Meadway) (registration process will be clogged with many marks that will
never mature into registered marks under the new law) [hereinafter Trademark Bill Snags]. See also
Howes, The Case Against Intention to Use, 51 TRADEMARK REP. 242 (1961) (intent to use system
would place an intolerable burden on Patent and Trademark Office in examining trademarks).
16. Trademark Law Change, supra note 5 (statement of Roger W. Harrell). For additional
criticisms of the 1988 Act, see generally March, Intention-to-Use-1938-1963, 53 TRADEMARK REP.
984 (1963) (questioning constitutionality of intent-to-use system); Van Senten, Proposed Trademark
Legislation on a Recording System for Declarations of Intent, 50 TRADEMARK REP. 221 (1960) (in-
tent to use system places undue emphasis on a formal recording system to the detriment of substan-
tive common law rights, and grants a right to those who have no basis for an actual claim of right)
[hereinafter Proposed Trademark Legislation]; Comment, Intent to Use Applications for Trademark
Registration, 35 WAYNE L. REv. 1135 (intent to use system results in less judicial flexibility to
address problem of priority) [hereinafter Comment]. But see Vinicombe, The Constitutionality of an
Intent to Use Amendment to the Lanham Act, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 361 (1988) (arguing that the
intent-to-use registration system falls within "commerce" which Congress may regulate and is there-
fore constitutional).
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to the need for the amendments. Part II explains the specific require-
ments of the 1988 Act and the manner in which the law attempts to
remedy the shortcomings of the Lanham Act. Part III addresses the crit-
icisms of the 1988 Act and the related allegations of unfair trade. Fi-
nally, Part IV proposes three approaches to the 1988 Act to guide the
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) in interpreting the Act's require-
ments and to simultaneously minimize any potential unfair competition.
I. THE LANHAM ACT AND ITS PROBLEMS
Common law trademark rights vest through adoption and use of a
trademark."7 Unlike other countries," the United States does not man-
date registration of a mark as a predicate to ownership rights.19 How-
17. S.C. OPPENHEIM, G. WESTON, P. MAGGS & R. SCHECTER, UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES
AND CONSUMER PROTECTION, 48 (4th ed. 1983) [hereinafter OPPENHEIM]. For example, Blue Bell,
Inc. v. Farah Manufacturing Co., 508 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1975), concerned two clothing manufac-
turers' competing claims to the trademark "Time Out." Both manufacturers wanted the trademark
for their men's sportswear lines. Id. at 1262-63. Neither party had registered the trademark; both
claimed to have established a common law right to the trademark through prior use in commerce.
Id. at 1265.
The outcome in Blue Bell turned on a determination of which company, filling actual sales orders,
first shipped goods bearing the trademark to members of the general public. Id. at 1267. Farah
made a bona fide shipment of goods to customers about a month before Blue Bell. Id. The court
held, therefore, that "Farah established priority of trademark use." Id.
A substantial number of arms-length sales over an extended period of time, where the goods are
clearly identified by a distinctive and widely advertised mark, will always be sufficient to establish
common law trademark rights as against any subsequent user of the mark. OPPENHEIM, supra.
However, it is risky to rely on mere "token use" to establish trademark rights. Id. See infra notes
51-56 and accompanying text.
For discussion of the distinction between a "use" that is sufficient to fend off opposition to a
trademark (as in Blue Bell above) and the mere "token use" necessary to establish sufficient grounds
for a registration, see infra notes 33-36, 41-45, 51-56 and accompanying text.
For an excellent analysis of how much and what kind of use is enough under differing circum-
stances, see Fletcher, "Time Out," "Snob, " "Wipeout," and "Chicken of the Sea" The Death Knell
of Token Use?, 65 TRADEMARK REP. 336 (1975).
18. No other commercially significant country requires use prior to application. Callmann,
Registration and Use in the Trademark Laws of Different Countries, 48 TRADEMARK REP. 395
(1958) [hereinafter Trademark Laws of Different Countries]. For a discussion of the Canadian in-
tent-to-use system, see Osborne, Intention to Use-The Canadian Experience, 53 TRADEMARK REP.
963 (1963); Robinson, The Canadian Trade Marks Act of 1954-A Review of Some of its Features, 49
TRADEMARK REP. 792 (1959); Morrow, The Concept of "Use" under Canadian Trademark Law, 65
TRADEMARK REP. 223 (1975). For a comparison to the intent-to-use system of Great Britain, see
Lloyd, British Law and Practice on Intention to Use, 51 TRADEMARK REP. 128 (1961).
19. OPPENHEIM, supra note 17, at 49. Use in commerce creates common law trademark own-
ership rights. See supra note 17. Registration is a method of protecting those rights, but it does not
create them. OPPENHEIM, supra note 17, at 48.
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ever, the federal registration system enhances common law protections of
trademark rights and guards against unfair competition.20 The trade-
mark register also establishes a public record of registered marks, en-
abling applicants to discover existing conflicts with the proposed mark.2"
A. The Use Requirement
At first glance, the "use in commerce" requirement of the Lanham
Act 2 2 appears simple.23 However, application of the concept is complex
and uncertain.24 The Lanham Act establishes a bifurcated definition of
"use in commerce."'2  First, the statute requires registrants to af-
20. OPPENHEIM, supra note 17, at 48. Trademark law is one part of Congress' efforts to pro-
vide a level playing field for commercial competition. Id. The Lanham Act itself provides that one
of its aims is protection against unfair competition. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988) (definition and overview
section of the Lanham Act).
21. 134 CONG. REc. 11,073 (1988) ("goal of federal trademark registration system is the crea-
tion of a record which accurately reflects all marks that are actually being used in the U.S. market-
place"). Because federal registration is not mandatory, Congress sought to provide incentives for
federal registration to facilitate the register's use as a reliable source for determining prior existing
rights in marks. OPPENHEIM, supra note 17, at 49. These incentives include: 1) nationwide con-
structive notice of rights; 2) right to use the federal registration symbol; 3) right to exclude importa-
tions that pose infringement threats; 4) prima facie evidence of the registrant's exclusive right to use
the mark; 5) incontestability for marks registered for five years; 6) access to federal courts; and 7)
various remedies for infringement. Id.
22. The first American trademark statute, Trademark Act of 1870, did not require prior use for
registration. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, §§ 677-84, 16 Stat. 210, reprinted in 5 R. CALLMANN,
UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARK AND MONOPOLIES, § 40.07 (Altman, 4th ed. 1985) [hereinaf-
ter CALLMANN]. In the Trademark Cases, the Supreme Court declared the 1870 Act unconstitu-
tional. U.S. v. Steffens, 100 U.S. 82, 99 (1879). In the Court's view, state law governs all common
law property, including trademarks. Id. at 92-93. The Court reasoned that trademarks are governed
by intrastate commerce and are beyond the reach of Congress' commerce power. Id. at 97-98. The
Court also rejected the suggestion that Congress could regulate trademarks under the patent and
copyright clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Steffens, 100 U.S. at 93, 94. Eleven years later
Congress passed another trademark registration law. Act of Mar. 3, 1881, ch. 138, 21 Stat. 502,
reprinted in CALLMANN, supra, at § 40.10. The 1881 Act was limited to registration of marks used
in commerce with foreign nations and Indian tribes and therefore, was easily within Congress' com-
merce clause power. Id. The trademark law passed in 1905 retained this limited use requirement
and remained in effect for the next forty-two years. Act of Feb. 20, 1905, 33 Stat. 724, ch. 592, as
amended, reprinted in CALLMANN, supra, at § 40.12. The Act of 1920 greatly expanded the scope of
the use requirement, permitting registration of any symbol used to distinguish goods if used in com-
merce for one year prior to application. Act of Mar. 19, 1920, Pub. Law 163, ch. 104, 41 Stat. 533,
Mar. 19, 1920, reprinted in CALLMANN, supra, at § 40.13.
23. Sacoff, The Trademark Use Requirement in Trademark Registration, Opposition and Can-
cellation Proceedings, 76 TRADEMARK REP. 99 (1986).
24. Id.
25. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988) provides in pertinent part:
For purposes of this chapter, a mark shall be deemed to be in use in commerce
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fix 26 the mark on the goods27 it purports to distinguish.2 1 Courts tradi-
tionally interpreted this provision strictly and required that the
trademark actually be on the goods 29 or, if appropriate, on the packaging
in which the goods were contained.30 The 1988 Act relaxes this aspect of
the use requirement in certain situations where affixation on the goods
themselves is impractical.3"
(1) on goods when-
(A) it is placed in any manner on the goods or their containers or the displays associated
therewith or on the tags or labels affixed thereto, or if the nature of the goods makes such
placement impracticable, then on documents associated with the goods or their sale, and
(B) the goods are sold or transported in ommere...
26. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1XA) (1988). For text in full, see supra note 25.
27. The "use in commerce" requirement applies equally to goods and services. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1053 allows registration of service marks on the Principle Register. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1127
(1988) (definition of service mark parallels that of trademark). But see Belnap & Thompson, Inc., 90
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 123 (1951) ("the definition of service marks offers a greater variety of possible
marks than is the case with trademarks for goods").
28. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988) provides:
The term "trademark" includes any word, name, symbol or device, or any combination
thereof used by a person to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique
product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the
goods, even if the source is unknown.
29. Application of Chicago Rawhide Manufacturing Co., 455 F.2d 563, 564 (C.C.P.A. 1972).
In Chicago Rawhide the manufacturer attempted to register the letters "DF' as a trademark for
mechanical seals used to protect shafts and housings. Id. at 564. The company based its application
on use of the mark on packing slips included with the goods in the shipping containers. Id. The
court, interpreting the statutory affixation requirements in 15 U.S.C. § 1127, see supra note 25, held
that a mark on the goods or its containers, or attached with a label or tag would have been sufficient,
but packing slips in the containers were not. Id. at 564-65. The court, therefore, upheld the refusal
to register the trademark. Id. The court noted that the language of the affixation requirement in the
Lanham Act differed from the Act of 1905 and held the changes to represent congressional intent to
narrow the scope of the use requirement with regard to affixation. Id. at 565.
30. See In re Lyndale Farms, 186 F.2d 723 (C.C.P.A. 1951). A cattle breeding partnership
affixed the name "Lyndale Farms" to the crates in which the cattle were shipped to the market. Id.
at 724. In reviewing the PTO's denial of the application, the court noted that the Trademark Trial
and Appeal Board recognizes that use of a mark on packaging is sometimes sufficient to establish
use. Id. at 728. However, the court continued, "The affixation required is not satisfied by affixation
to a container whose nature in relation to the goods transported is such that its use in the marketing
process is ended when the transportation phase itself is at an end." Id. at 728. In affirming the
PTO's decision, the court reasoned that because cattle are not marketed in crates, the mark would
not identify the cattle to retail purchasers. Id.
31. As amended in 1988, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 now provides that applicants may affix marks on
"documents associated with the goods or their sale" if the nature of the goods makes direct affixation
impracticable. Congress contemplated that this broadened definition would apply to bulk goods
such as oils, chemicals and grain. S. Rep. No. 515, supra note 10, at 5608.
Under the former statute, the PTO turned down the application of a manufacturer who sought to
register a trademark for liquid by-products of its wood pulping process. In re ITT Rayonier, Inc.,
208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 86 (ITAB 1980). The by-products were pumped directly into railroad cars
and, on delivery, were pumped out into the purchaser's storage tanks. Id. The applicant used a
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Second, the use requirement provides that registrants must sell or
transport the marked goods in commerce. 32 In contrast to the strict judi-
cial interpretation of the affixation requirement, courts review the suffi-
ciency of use by different standards according to the procedure in which
the issue of use arises. 3 If a third party challenges the sufficiency of use,
courts construe the requirement strictly.34 For registration purposes,
courts follow a much more liberal policy. 35 This liberal approach gives
rise to the practice of token use. 36
B. Token Use
Development of a trademark involves a great deal of time and ex-
pense.37 Manufacturers must engineer a product, design and produce the
mark on "informational bulletins" that customers received prior to sale. Id. Despite the apparent
impossibility of actually affixing any kind of mark on the product or its packaging the board denied
the registration and the ITAB upheld the denial. Id. at 87. Under the new statute, the applicant
presumably would have had greater success.
32. See supra note 25 and accomphnying text.
33. Sacoff, supra note 23 at 108.
34. The different standards apparently arise out of a judicial desire to preserve rights recognized
under the common law of trademark ownership. The court in Blue Bell Inc. v. Farah Mfg. Co., 508
F.2d 1260, 1267 (5th Cir. 1975), drew a distinction between "use in trade," which establishes owner-
ship rights at common law, and the "use in commerce" requirement for registration under the Lan-
ham Act. Following Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Midwest Chrome Process Co., 183 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 758 (TTAB 1974), the Blue Bell court noted that due to the expense and risk involved in
attempting to register a trademark for a new product, "and in the absence of an intent to use stat-
ute," a token sale might be sufficient to meet the "use in commerce" requirement and attain registra-
tion under the federal statute. Id. On the other hand, a party claiming common law ownership
rights must establish "use in trade" by making a bona fide commercial use of the mark that distin-
guishes the mark in the minds of the relevant public. Token use does not meet this stricter standard.
Id. at 1268. For an attorney trying to advise a client in the planning stages, the result is confusing.
Sacoff, supra note 23, at 109. Token use is sufficient to register the trademark, but insufficient to
ward off an objection by a third party alleging prior ownership of the trademark. Id. Because there
is no way to predict whether such a challenger will appear, the law leaves the attorney no basis to
decide which level of use best suits the client. Id.
35. See supra note 34. See also Blue Bell, 508 F.2d at 1267 (liberal policy does not apply when
the only issues before the court are priority of use and ownership of a mark); Standard Pressed Steel,
183 U.S.P.Q. at 765 (token use sufficient to support an application to register a trademark when a
"dispute as to priority of use and ownership of a mark is not involved").
36. Id. For a full discussion of token use, see infra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
37. The United States Trademark Association Trademark Review Commission Report and Rec-
ommendations to USTA President and Board of Directors, 77 TRADEMARK REP. 375, 392 (1987)
[hereinafter Commission Report] ("Bringing a brand to market is costly in time, effort and money.");
Whittredge, The Practical Trademark Application-Founded on Intended Use of the Mark; Dirksen
Bill, S. 2786, 54 TRADEMARK REP. 883, 885 (1964) (Product engineering, design and production of
labels and packaging, pre-production advertising, and the actual production and distribution of the
product often takes more than a year. During this time there is "no possibility of volume use of the
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packaging, develop advertising strategies, initiate production, and elicit
retail orders before a product is ready for the marketplace.38 This pro-
cess often takes more than a year, during which time there is no opportu-
nity to engage in substantial use of the new trademark.3 9 In order to
reserve the mark for use with the new product, however, manufacturers
cannot afford to wait until the product is ready.'
In recognition of market realities, the Trademark Trial and Appeal
Board41 (TTAB) and the federal courts4' often accepted "token use" of
new trademark."). The actual cost involved in trademark development varies, depending on the
number of possible choices, the scope of the intended market, the type of search conducted and
numerous unforeseen circumstances. For example, a company seeking an appropriate trademark for
a new product might hire a consulting firm to generate several choices. Consulting services often
include market research, consumer feedback, and the use of focus groups. The services range in cost
from $20,000 to S100,000 for one product study. Telephone conversation with Helen Turner, Re-
search Manager, Corporate Research and Development Anheuser-Busch Brewing Co. (May 3, 1990)
[hereinafter Conversation with Helen Turner]. Based on its research and studies, the consulting firm
recommends possible trademarks to the legal counsel of the company, who in turn may generate
$5,000 to $10,000 in legal fees plus expenses. Id. These searches may include expensive computer-
based searches, a scan of trade journals for common law trademark references, searches of trade
names in phone books, and personal in-depth knowledge of the field. Id. In addition to these pre-
cautions, the company seeking a trademark might retain a service company to conduct searches of
federal marks. Telephone conversation with Arch Ahern, Associate General Counsel, Anheuser-
Busch Brewing Co. (May 3, 1990). Based on the results of all these searches, the company's attorney
recommends one or more marks to the company.
Typically, the company's Research and Development division conducts consumer studies of the
various marks. Such studies may cost over $20,000. Conversation with Helen Turner supra. Fur-
thermore, the Research and Development division may develop product design and packaging for
several alternative marks, at significant additional expense. Id. Finally, Research and Development
may conduct market tests in selected geographic areas, often using different names in different cities.
Id.
This lengthy process is designed to uncover any possible conflict with existing marks. Often,
however, use of a similar mark goes unnoticed until a company selects a trademark. In such a case,
the company may find it necessary to purchase the trademark from the first user. Id.
38. Whittredge, supra note 37, at 885.
39. Id.
40. Critics assailed the use-based system for being out of step with market realities and used
this allegation to promote an intent-to-use system. Commission Report, supra note 37, at 392 ("A
pre-filing use standard is unrealistic.... [T]o make one incur such costs before some assurance it
may register or retain the brand is logistically perverse."). See Garner, A Pre-Use Trademark Appli-
cation Law, 50 TRADEMARK REP. 230 (1960) (arguing that companies are vulnerable to losses of
time and money under the "use" requirement); Giles, Pre-Use Applications, 43 TRADEMARK REP.
1121, 1122 (1953) (under an intent-to-use system, applicant could find out whether the mark was
registrable before launching an expensive, nationwide promotion). See also supra note 37.
41. Sodima v. International Yogurt Co., 662 F. Supp. 839 (D. Or. 1987); Bertolli USA Inc. v.
Filippo Bertolli Fine Foods Ltd., 662 F. Supp. 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); In re Ancha Electronics, Inc., 1
U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1318 (TIAB 1986).
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the mark as sufficient use for federal registration.43 Token use is a legal
fiction in which the applicant ships' goods marked with the new trade-
mark, but the goods are often not of the applicant's own manufacture,
and the mark is not in its intended form.4" Applicants then file for and
receive registration based on this use. Manufacturers, however, may
change strategies and abandon the originally proposed mark.4 6 Conse-
quently, token use allows unused marks, or "deadwood," to clutter the
Principal Register. Deadwood on the register prevents another party's
legitimate use of a mark which should otherwise be available.47
In addition to creating deadwood, token use is not available to all busi-
nesses or industries. For example, a service industry, which cannot use a
mark until it actually offers its services, cannot engage in the practice.48
It is equally impossible for the manufacturers of large or expensive prod-
ucts, such as airplanes, to make token use of a mark in commerce. 49 Fur-
thermore, small businesses and individuals, lacking the resources and
knowledge necessary to engage in token use, are often at a disadvantage
to large companies, who enjoy longer lead time and greater familiarity
with use procedures.50
Commentators criticized token use as a means of satisfying the Lan-
ham Act's use requirement. 51 Moreover, practitioners found it an unreli-
able basis upon which to file a trademark registration application because
it was not clear whether a particular token use would be sufficient use for
registration.52 Even if token use satisfied the use in commerce require-
42. Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 390 F.2d 1015 (CCPA 1968), cert. de-
nied, 393 U.S. 831 (1968).
43. See generally Kegan, Trademark Use-Fact or Fiction, 55 TRADEMARK REP. 175 (1965).
44. The goods must be transported or sold in commerce. See supra note 25.
45. Whittredge, supra note 37, at 885.
46. Kegan, supra note 43, at 179 (trademarked product may never reach the market because of
manufacturing difficulties, unfavorable public response, failure to satisfy government health, safety
or labeling regulations, or other reasons).
47. Commission Report, supra note 37, at 407 (deadwood impairs utility of register by need-
lessly discouraging the use of marks which are actually and legally available).
48. S. REP. No. 515, supra note 10, at 6, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
at 5582.
49. Id.
50. Borchard, Senate Bill on the Mark, ADVERTISING AGE, Mar. 21, 1988 at 48.
51. See Pattishall, The Lanham Trademark Act-Its Impact over Four Decades, 76 TRADE-
MARK REP. 193 (1986) (token use is a vice); Whittredge, supra note 37, at 886 (token use gives no
warning to others about the advent of a new mark); Kegan, supra note 43, at 177 (token use estab-
lishes a de facto system of reserve trademark registration). But see Sacoff, supra note 23, at 103
(token use is a "sensible and defensible technique" to meet the problematic requirement of prior use).
52. Richfield Oil Corp. v. Dietrich Field, Inc., 279 F.2d 885 (CCPA 1960) (display of mark on
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ment, it might not suffice to protect the trademark against an opposing
party that meanwhile had made regular commercial use of the mark. 3
Finally, token use failed to put the commercial world on notice that the
user claimed rights in a particular trademark.5
Because of its commercial invisibility, token use could blindside even a
conscientious company that had begun to use a trademark in regular
commerce. 5 Despite its shortcomings, however, token use offered po-
tential applicants the only avenue of relief from the hardships of the Lan-
ham Act's use requirement.5 6
C. Registration Preference for Foreign Companies
In addition to modernizing trademark law and eradicating token use,
Congress, in the 1988 amendments, intended to eliminate the preference
which foreign companies enjoyed over domestic companies when apply-
ing for trademark registration. 7
Section 44 of the Lanham Act" extends the rights conferred by the
Lanham Act to any foreign national whose country of origin is party to a
treaty with the United States regarding trademark protection or unfair
competition,59 including, notably, the Paris Convention of 18 83 .60 In In
coupons redeemable for product is insufficient use); R.J. Moran Co. v. Gordeon, 44 Trademark Rep.
861, 101 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 206 (Comr. Pats. 1954) (ordering of labels insufficient use); Proctor &
Gamble Co. v. Jacqueline Cochran, Inc., 45 Trademark Rep. 330, 102 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 440 (Comr.
Pats. 1954) (shipment of one bottle of marked product to sales office in another state insufficient use);
Western Stove Co. v. Geo. D. Roper Corp., 82 F. Supp. 206 (S.D. Cal. 1949) (advertising of a
product with a trademark insufficient use). See also Kegan, supra note 43, at 180-81 (listing thirteen
different practices that were held insufficient use to support registration of a trademark).
53. Van Camp Sea Food Co. v. Universal Trading Corp., 53 Trademark Rep. 1192, 138
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 323 (ITAB 1963) (earlier token use not followed by regular commercial use insuffi-
cient to establish priority in a mark over claim of second comer who engaged in regular commercial
use). See supra note 17 for a discussion of Blue Bell Inc. v. Farah Manufacturing Co., 508 F.2d 260
(5th Cir. 1975) (neither party's token use was sufficient to establish a common law trademark right;
priority of regular use in commerce determined right to the mark).
54. Giles, supra note 40, at 1122-1123. (token use does not afford others the opportunity for
discovery of the use).
55. See supra notes 52 and 54.
56. See Sacoff, supra note 23, at 103; S. REP. No. 515, supra note 10, at 6, reprinted in 1988
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5582 (token use is essential under current law).
57. 134 CoNG. REc. S16,972 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1988) (statement of Sen. DeConcini); 134
CONG. REc. 11,073 (1988) (statement of Sen. DeConcini); see supra note 10 and accompanying text.
58. 15 U.S.C § 1126 (1988).
59. Section 44 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1126(b) (1988), extends the Act's protection to
"[a]ny person whose country of origin is a party to any convention or treaty relating to trademarks,
trade or commercial names, or the repression of unfair competition, to which the United States is
also a party."
Washington University Open Scholarship
762 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
re Certain Incomplete Trademark Applications,61 the Commissioner of
Patents and Trademarks (Commissioner) refused to grant registration to
foreign applications failing to allege actual use in commerce.62 The Com-
missioner reasoned that Article 6 of the Paris Convention, the telle queue
63clause, prohibited signatory countries from refusing registration based
on the form or nature of a mark."4 The clause, according to the Commis-
sioner's argument, did not limit the power of signatory countries to en-
force their own substantive requirements concerning registrability.6 s
Thus, the Commissioner concluded that neither the telle quelle clause
nor section 44 prohibited the United States from requiring foreign appli-
cants to make a showing of actual use of a proposed mark."
In a dramatic policy reversal,67 the TTAB expressly overruled In re
Certain Incomplete Applications in the seminal case Crocker National
Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce.6" In Crocker, the Board
held that the actual use requirement does not apply to foreign nationals
seeking registration of marks in the United States.69 The Board ex-
plained that removing the actual use requirement for foreign applicants
harmonized American and foreign systems of trademark registration.70
The Board noted that section 44(d)(2) 71 required foreign applications
to conform "as nearly as practicable" to the requirements of the Lanham
Act.72 Because no other country required a showing of use for registra-
tion,73 the Board reasoned that requiring foreign companies to allege use
before registration was impractical.74 Finally, the Board stated that Arti-
60. The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, March 10, 1883, 21 U.S.T.
1583, 24 U.S.T. 2140, T.I.A.S. No. 6923 [hereinafter Paris Convention], is a "convention or treaty"
within the meaning of § 44, and the United States is a party to the Convention.
61. 137 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 69 (Comr. Pat. 1963).
62. Id. at 78.
63. Paris Convention, supra note 60, AA. 6 quinquies.
64. In Re Certain Incomplete Applications, 137 U.S.P.Q. at 75 n.8.
65. Id. at 75 & n.8.
66. Id. at 77 & n.7.
67. See Messerli, Registration of a Trademark Under Section 44 of the Lanham Act and the
Requirement of Actual Use, 77 TRADEMARK REP. 103, 105 (1987) (judicial interpretation of section
44 is "eminently political").
68. 223 U.S.P.Q. 909, 928 (TTAB 1984) (BNA).
69. Id. at 924.
70. Id. at 927-28. For an argument refuting the Crocker court's assertion that the U.S. registra-
tion system is not as practical as that of other countries, see Messerli, supra note 67, at 121-127.
71. 15 U.S.C. § 1126(d)(2) (1982).
72. Crocker, 223 U.S.P.Q. at 916.
73. See supra note 18.
74. Crocker, 223 U.S.P.Q. at 916.
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cle 6B of the Paris Convention, which enumerates the possible grounds
for refusal under the Convention, 75 does not include any mention of ac-
tual use.76 Accordingly, the Board concluded that the telle queue clause
did not support a denial of registration for lack of use."
SCM Corp. v. Langis Foods, Ltd.78 provided foreign applicants with
another advantage over domestic applicants seeking to establish priority
of use for trademark registration in the United States.79 In SCM, the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that foreign nationals
establish constructive use 80 for purposes of registration in the United
States upon filing an application for registration in their home coun-
tries.81 Constructive use gives the foreign applicant a substantive right of
priority82 for six months when seeking registration in the United States
pursuant to section 44(d).8 3 The SCM court determined that an inter-
vening use on the part of a domestic applicant during the six month pe-
riod does not invalidate the foreign applicant's superior right to
registration.84
The cumulative effect of the decisions in Crocker and SCM was to al-
low foreign applicants to obtain registration in the United States without
75. Article 6(B) provides in pertinent part:
Trademarks covered by this Article may be neither denied registration nor invalidated except in
the following cases:
1. When they are of such a nature as to infringe rights acquired by third parties in the
country where protection is claimed;
2. When they are devoid of any distinctive character, or consist exclusively of signs or
indications which may serve, in trade, to designate the kind, quality, quantity, intended
purpose, value, place of origin, of the goods, or the time of production, or have become
customary in the current language or in the bona fide and established practices of the trade
of the country where protection is claimed;
3. When they are contrary to morality or public order and, in particular, of such a
nature as to deceive the public. It is understood that a mark may not be considered con-
trary to public order for the sole reason that it does not conform to a provision of the
legislation on marks, except if such provision itself relates to public order.
76. Crocker, 223 U.S.P.Q. at 921.
77. Id.
78. 539 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
79. Id. at 201.
80. The TRC defined "constructive use" as "that which establishes a priority date with the
same legal effect as the earliest actual use of a trademark at common law." Commission Report,
supra note 37, at 39 n.28.
81. SCM, 539 F.2d at 199.
82. Messerli, supra note 67, at 110. The district court in SCM construed section 44(d) as grant-
ing procedural advantages only. SCM, 539 F.2d at 199.
83. SCM, 539 F.2d at 200, 201 (citing art. 4, sections A and B of the Paris Convention, supra
note 60).
84. SCM, 539 F.2d at 201.
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using a trademark anywhere in the world and regardless of any actual
use by a domestic applicant.8 5 These inequities, as well as the other
problems created by the Lanham Act's registration system, set in motion
the chain of events culminating in the Trademark Law Revision Act of
1988.86
II. PROVISIONS AND IMPACT OF THE INTENT-TO-USE AMENDMENT
A. Historical Development
The Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988 represents the first attempt
at intent-to-use legislation. Prior to the 1988 Act, Congress considered
intent-to-use proposals on at least six different occasions, none of which
came to fruition.87 The 1988 Act had its genesis in 1985, when the
United States Trademark Association (USTA) chartered a special com-
mittee known as the Trademark Review Commission (Commission) in
order to evaluate the effectiveness of the United States registration sys-
tem and make recommendations for improvements. 8 After two years of
exhaustive study,8 9 the Commission submitted the Report and Recom-
85. See supra notes 57-84 and accompanying text.
86. Concern over the decision in Crocker probably renewed interest in an intent-to-use require-
ment. Commission Report, supra note 37, at 369. The Trademark Review Commission (TRC) em-
phasized, however, that its support of an intent-to-use system was not a response to Crocker. Id. at
404.
87. See Whittredge, supra note 37, at 883 n.1 (citing S. 2786, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 110 CONG.
Rac. 9512 (1964); H.R. 1137, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 109 CONG. REC. 56 (1963); H.R. 12,009, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess., 108 CONG. RFc. 9749 (1962); S. 150, 87th Cong., Ist Sess (1961); S. 1063, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); S. 4254, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 104 CONG. REc. 16,619 (1958)). The 1959
Dirksen Bill represented the most significant attempt at intent-to-use legislation. S. 1063, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). Drafted by the Trademark Committee of the Patent Law Association of
Chicago, the bill shared many similarities with the 1988 Act. Although the Dirksen Bill enjoyed
wide-ranging support, Congress failed to enact the legislation. For a comprehensive analysis of the
Dirksen provisions, see Whittredge, supra note 37, at 887-896.
88. Commission Report, supra note 37, Foreword at vii. The Commission's charter adopted on
July 5, 1985 gives the Commission plenary authority to review the Lanham Act in light of its origi-
nal objectives, the objectives of U.S. public policy, and the present and future needs of commerce. If
the study indicates that changes in the trademark system are appropriate, the Commission must
make recommendations and assist in drafting proposed revision legislation. Id. at 383.
89. S. REP. No. 515, supra note 10, at 2, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
at 5578 (the extensive study was the product of more than 2 years of analysis, debate, and consensus-
building by trademark owners, attorneys, and other private sector experts). The Commission's first
task was to complete an exhaustive questionnaire designed to ascertain the members' special con-
cerns. The results of the questionnaire formed the basis of the Commission's study. Special commit-
tees then formed to review particular areas of concern. Commission Report, supra note 37 at 383-
386.
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mendations to the USTA Board of Directors on August 21, 1987, which
adopted the report in its entirety on September 13, 1987.90 The Commis-
sion's report formed the basis of the Trademark Law Revision Act of
1988.91
Expressing general satisfaction with the registration system,92 the
Commission rejected a sweeping overhaul of the Lanham Act in favor of
changes to particular provisions.93 Specifically, the Commission uncov-
ered widespread frustration with the process for developing new trade-
marks.94 Furthermore, the Commission objected to the practice of token
use95 and the presence of deadwood on the Principal Register.96 The
Commission made several proposals to remedy these maladies, including
the adoption of intent-to-use legislation.97
B. The Specific Provisions of the Intent-to-Use Requirement
The Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988 does nothing to upset the
basic tenet of trademark law that trademark ownership rights vest
through use of a mark in commerce.9" The 1988 Act extends the tradi-
tional rule by creating a dual system of trademark registration.99 The
Act affords applicants a choice between filing systems: it preserves the
90. Commission Report, supra note 37, Foreword at vii.
91. S. REP. No. 515, supra note 10, at 2-3, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 5578-79.
92. Specifically, the Commission concluded that the Lanham Act continues to fulfill its statu-
tory objectives of protecting the public as well as the investment of trademark owners. Commission
Report, supra note 37, at 386. Second, the Commission found that the Act satisfactorily accommo-
dates present day business and commercial practices with the limited exceptions relating to the need
for an intent-to-use system and to eliminate token use. Id. at 387. The Commission also found that
the Act effectively implements the public policy objectives of the United States and furthers the
principles and objectives of the trademark concept and an optimal trademark system. Id. Finally,
the Commission stated that the Act appears adaptable to future business and commercial changes.
Id.
93. Id. at 377.
94. Id.
95. Id. The Commission concluded that token use should be discouraged because it delays
filings, is contrived, is commercially invisible, perpetuates deadwood on the register, and creates
legal uncertainty. Id. at 393.
96. Id. at 387.
97. Id. at 390-392.
98. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
99. Commission Report, supra note 37, at 390 (applicants may base registrations on either use in
commerce or a bona fide intention to use); S. REP. No. 515, supra note 10, reprinted in 1988 U.S.
CONG. CODE & ADMIN NEWS at 5585 (intent-to-use system offers an alternative to current system
of registration).
1990]
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"use in commerce" prong of the Lanham Act ' 0° and establishes a new
intent-to-use prong for proposed marks.'10
Under the intent-to-use provision, an applicant must file a written ap-
plication with the PTO specifying the applicant's bona fide intention to
use the mark in commerce and the goods or services involved.'0 2 Upon
receipt of the application, a PTO examining attorney examines the mark
to ascertain whether registration is appropriate, 10 3 and if so, the exam-
iner Submits the mark for publication in the Official Gazette. 0 4 If the
mark receives no opposition or survives an opposition proceeding, the
PTO issues a notice of allowance to the applicant.0 5 Applicants then
have six months in which to commence use and file a statement to that
effect. 106
Once an applicant commences use and fies the necessary use declara-
tion, 107  the PTO conducts a second examination,10  to determine
100. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a) (1988). See supra notes 22-36 and accompanying text.
101. 15.U.S.C. § 1051(b)(1988).
102. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b)(1)(A) (1988) provides in pertinent part:
A person who has a bona fide intention ... to use a trademark in commerce may apply to
register the trademark... on the principal register:
(1) By filing in the Patent and Trademark Office -
(A) a written application... specifying ... applicant's bona fide intention to use the
mark in commerce, the goods on or in connection with which the applicant has a
bona fide intention to use the mark and the mode or manner in which the mark is
intended to be used on or in connection with such goods....
See also Amendment to Rules of Practice in Trademark Cases, 54 Fed. Reg. 37,589 (1989) (to be
codified at 37 C.F.R. § 2.33(b)(2)). The Rules of Practice explicitly apply to services as well as
goods. Id. In general, the requirements for registration under the intent-to-use prong parallel those
of the "use" prong. See S. REP. No. 515, supra note 10, at 23, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws at 5585.
103. 37 C.F.R. § 2.61(a) (1989).
104. 37 C.F.R. § 2.80 (1989).
105. 15 U.S.C. § 1063(b)(2) (1988).
106. 15 U.S.C. § 105 l(d)(1) (1988). Applicants who are unable to make use of the mark within
the initial six month period may obtain an automatic six month extension upon request. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1051(d)(2) (1988). Additional six month extensions up to a total of twenty-four months are avail-
able upon a showing of "good cause" for nonuse. Id.
The House expressed particular concern about the time extensions available to intent-to-use appli-
cants. H.R. REP. No. 1028, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1988). To prevent the accumulation of un-
used marks on the register, the House added the "good cause" requirement to the provision for time
extensions. 134 CONG. REC. H10,419 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1989). The House intended the "good
cause" requirement to supplement the requirement of a "bona fide intent" to use the mark. Id. at
H10,420. In an effort to clarify the broad language of "good cause," the House directed the Com-
missioner to develop guidelines indicating acceptable instances of nonuse. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(d)(2)
(1988). ("The Commission shall issue regulations setting forth guidelines for determining what con-
stitutes good cause for purposes of this paragraph.").
107. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(d)(l) (1988).
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whether the mark as actually used coincides with the drawing and identi-
fication of goods or services in the original application. If registration
ensues, the certificate of registration applies only to those goods specified
in the statement of use."c9 Registration of the mark converts the filing
date of the application to the constructive use date of the mark, 110 confer-
ring on the registrant a nationwide right of priority in the mark as
against all subsequent claimants.111
The purpose of the intent-to-use provision is to eliminate the necessity
for applicants to engage in token use in order to gain access to the regis-
tration system. 1 2 The 1988 Act retains the requirement of use, however,
as a final hurdle to achieving actual registration under the intent-to-use
prong. l13  To prevent applicants from employing token use to achieve
registration, Congress strengthened the definition of "use in commerce"
to apply only to "bona fide use." ' 14 Under the revised definition,
adopted almost verbatim from the Commission Report,11 5 an applicant
must use the mark "in the ordinary course of trade" and not "merely to
reserve registration rights."1 16
108. Id. While the statute allows the PTO to examine factors set forth in § 1052(a)-(e), the
Senate expressed concern that this examination not upset the certainty intent-to-use applicants have
in the integrity of their marks. 134 CONG. REC. S16,973 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1988) (statement of Sen.
DeConcini). Accordingly, the Senate emphasized that issues of registrability be examined in the
second examination only in those rare situations when these issues only become apparent after an
applicant uses the mark. Id. Otherwise, if the issue can be addressed during the first examination,
the PTO should do so. Id.
109. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(d)(1) (1988).
110. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c) (1988); see supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text (explanation of
constructive use date and its role in trademark applications by foreign nationals under § 44 of the
Lanham Act.).
11. Id. For a criticism of this aspect of the intent-to-use system, see Comment, supra note 16,
at 1151-1153.
112. S. REP. No. 515, supra note 10, at 22-23, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws at 5585.
113. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(d) (1988). The 1988 Act left intact the original registration method re-
quiring preapplicaiton use. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a) (1988).
114. S. REP. No. 515, supra note 10, at 44, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 5607 (amended definition of "use in commerce" intended to "eliminate the commercially
transparent practice of token use"). 15 U.S.C. § 1127 provides in pertinent part: "The term 'use in
commerce' means the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade and not made merely to
reserve a right in a mark." Some critics argue that the strengthened definition does nothing to
alleviate token use. Comment, supra note 16, at 1153.
115. Commission Report, supra note 37, at 391: "The term 'used in commerce' means such use
made in the ordinary course of trade, commensurate with the circumstances, and not made merely
to reserve a right in a mark."
116. See supra note 114. The legislative history reveals that Congress intended the courts to
consider the practices of the particular industry when evaluating the sufficiency of an applicant's use.
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C. Impact of the 1988 Act
Congress intended the 1988 Act to eliminate three problems arising
under the Lanham Act: 1) uncertainty in the development of trade-
marks; 2) the contrived practice of token use; and 3) the preference en-
joyed by foreign applicants. 117 The 1988 Act potentially makes great
strides towards alleviating these obstacles.
The intent-to-use prong and the strengthened "use" definition provide
potential applicants a measure of security when seeking registration.
118
First, potential registrants filing on the basis of intent to use can ascertain
the existence of a conflicting use and choose a suitable alternative before
expending great amounts of time and money. 1 19 Furthermore, applicants
may rely on a statutory grant of protection for proposed marks and no
longer need to rely on the unpredictable practice of token use to reserve a
mark.12 Moreover, the revised "use" definition effectively prohibits the
practice of token use12 ' and restores integrity to the registration
system. 122
In addition, the retroactive constructive use date protects the regis-
trant from conflicting common law claims by subsequent users and al-
lows them to use their marks with confidence. 1 23 Constructive use may
S. REP. No. 515, supra note 10, at 44, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5607.
("The committee intends that the revised definition of 'use in comerce' be interpreted to mean com-
mercial use which is typical in a particular industry."). See infra notes 157-60 and accompanying
text.
117. 134 CONG. REc. 11,073 (1988) (statement of Sen. DeConcini); 134 CONG. REC. S16,972
(daily ed. Oct. 20, 1988).
118. 134 CONG. REc. S16,972 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1988) (statement of Sen. DeConcini) (Intent-to-
use amendment "would eliminate potential problems and sometimes futile expenditures faced by
applicants under the existing preapplication use in commerce requirement. ... [R]edefining the
meaning of use to a stricter standard" would help eliminate marks not actually in commercial use).
119. Giles, supra note 40, at 1122 (applicant could find out before launching an expensive na-
tionwide promotion whether his mark was registrable).
120. Under the intent-to-use registration method, the filing date becomes the constructive use
date when registration is complete, which protects the registrant from claims by subsequent users.
See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
121. The definition of "use in commerce" has become equivalent to regular commercial use
under the 1988 amendments. Token use simply will not suffice to satisfy the amended definition (or
at least, that is what Congress intended). See supra note 114.
122. Because of the commercially invisible nature of token use, there was no way of knowing
whether a particular mark was actually in use in commerce. See supra notes 41-56 and 112-16 and
accompanying text.
123. Commission Report, supra note 37, at 397. Without the protection of constructive use,
intent-to-use registrations are also vulnerable to pirates who could comb the register for such marks
and then seek to exploit a company's commitment in time and money to the unused mark.
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indirectly encourage trademark users to seek registration of their
marks,124 thus improving the accuracy of the trademark record and pro-
viding additional security to applicants.
The constructive use provision also provides domestic applicants a de-
gree of parity with foreign applicants filing under section 44.125 A sec-
tion 44 applicant may still obtain registration of a mark without actual
use 126 while domestic applicants are required to show proof of use before
registration ensues.1 27
However, the 1988 Act requires foreign as well as domestic applicants
to state on the application for registration their bona fide intention to use
the proposed mark in the United States 12' This requirement places do-
mestic and foreign applicants on a level playing field with respect to pro-
cedural filing requirements.1 29 The requirement does not interfere with
the treaty obligations of the United States under the Paris Convention
because the amendment does not require the foreign applicant to show
actual use. 130  Foreign nationals need only state their firm intention to
use the mark in the United States eventually.
III. CRITICISM OF THE 1988 ACT
Critics perennially attack intent-to-use legislation on the ground that
such a registration system encourages mass hoarding of trademarks, al-
lowing applicants to gain unfair marketing advantages. 3' Opponents es-
124. Commission Report, supra note 37, at 398 (constructive use also encourages searching of the
register). Id.
125. Klein, Trademark Law Revision, 16 AIPLA Q.J. 154, 158 (1988).
126. Klein, Trademark Law Revision, supra note 125, at 158-159. The Commission expressed
concern that requiring actual use by § 44 applicant might interfere with U.S. treaty obligations.
Commission Report, supra note 37, at 404. The Commission felt, however, that § 45 addressed all
potential problems because registration under § 44 may be cancelled if abandoned due to nonuse for
two consecutive years. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 ("nonuse for two consecutive years shall be prima facie
evidence of abandonment").
127. See supra notes 113, 126 and accompanying text.
128. 15 U.S.C. § 1126(dX2) provides that a § 44 application must "conform as nearly as practi-
cable to the requirements of this chapter, including a statement that the applicant has a bona fide
intention to use the mark in commerce."
129. Congress thought it appropriate to require § 44 applicants to meet the same requirements
for registration required of domestic parties seeking registration under the intent-to-use system. S.
REP. No. 515, supra note 10, at 43, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5606.
130. Id.
131. See March, supra note 16, at 988 ("I can go in and make a showing that I had filed applica-
tion for 100 marks that were never used before" quoting Harrison F. Lyman)); Van Santen, supra
note 16, at 224 ("intent is less appurtenant to an enterprise related to the marketing of goods than is
fully recorded trademark registration").
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pecially emphasize the susceptibility of small businesses and individuals
to harm as a result of such practices. 132 Not surprisingly, the "hoarding"
arguments resurfaced in the debate over the 1988 Act, albeit with a new
gloss. Specifically, critics feared that leaving "bona fide intent" unde-
fined would have the practical effect of rendering the requirement a nul-
lity.1 33 As it now stands, opponents argue that the bona fide intent
requirement is so vague that applicants could base registration applica-
tions on little more than a whim and the payment of fees. 134
Critics charge that the amendment will allow companies with adequate
resources to clog the registration process with applications for marks
they never intend to use.'35 The brunt of this hoarding would fall on
small business concerns.1 36 The previous registration system disadvan-
taged smaller companies because of the expense involved in a compre-
hensive search of the register.' 37 These companies, critics say, would
continue to suffer injury under the new dual system due to the increased
costs associated with searching the trademark register for marks not ac-
tually in use but statutorily protected. 138
The legislative history reveals Congress' concern about the potential
for abuse of the intent-to-use system. The Senate Subcommittee on Pat-
ents, Copyrights and Trademarks considered including in the legislation
a statutory definition of "bona fide intent," a provision limiting the
number of contemporaneous filings available to an applicant, and a pro-
hibition on refiling for the same mark.' 39 The Subcommittee rejected
these proposals, however, concluding that the intent-to-use system in-
cluded sufficient safeguards to prevent abuse."4 In addition, the Sub-
committee sought to maintain flexibility in the administration of the
132. See, Trademark Bill Snags, supra note 15, at 20 (intent-to-use system permits large compa-
nies to reserve considerable numbers of marks for a period in excess of five years); House Panel Hears
Views, supra note 15, at 490 (small businesses are less equipped than larger companies to search
trademark register for a large number of marks); Comment, supra note 16, at 1153 (constructive use
for marks not in use increases expenses involved in searching the register, affecting smaller compa-
nies with limited resources).
133. House Panel Hears Views, supra note 15, at 490 (statement of Roberta Jacobs-Meadway).
134. Id. See also supra note 131.
135. Trademark Bill Snags, supra note 15, at 20.
136. Comment, supra note 16, at 1153.
137. Id.
138. See supra note 132.
139. S. REP. No. 515, supra note 10, at 24, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws at 5586.
140. Id. See infra note 144.
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trademark laws. 141 Still, some critics remained unsatisfied with the unde-
fined "bona fide intent" language.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE HOARDING PROBLEM
Even proponents of the 1988 Act must concede the intent-to-use sys-
tem's potential for abuse.' 42 In the brief period since the 1988 Act went
into effect, applicants have inundated the PTO with registration
applications. 143
Congress, however, concluded in its deliberations that the 1988 Act
contains adequate safeguards to minimize abuse. 1" Moreover, the vari-
ous adjudicating bodies responsible for interpreting the trademark laws
have demonstrated a great propensity for balancing the equities of a
given situation to achieve a fair result.145 Accordingly, courts may confi-
141. Id.
142. The practice of token use under the Lanham Act, however, created a de facto intent-to-use
system. Commission Report, supra note 37, at 392-93 (to the extent that applicants filed token use
applications and adjudicating bodies upheld them, the U.S. had an intent-to-use system before Con-
gress passed the legislation). Furthermore, the former registration system failed to provide any ave-
nue of relief for frustrated applicants. Conversely, Congress designed the 1988 Act with just such
relief in mind.
143. In a nine-week period from November 16, 1989 to January 19, 1990, the PTO received
24,536 applications, including those for extra classes, as compared to 13,594 received for the roughly
equivalent time period from November 14, 1988 to January 16, 1989. Telephone interview with
Karen Stroehecker, Office of the Assistant Commissioner (Feb. 6, 1990). The increase during that
period could also be due to the fact that some potential applicants may have held their applications
in anticipation of the new law, and the PTO perceives that filings will level off. Id. For a compari-
son to the impact of intent-to-use legislation on filings in Canada shortly after passage of its law, see
Osborne, supra note 18, at 972. The Canadian system, which went into effect in 1954, saw filings
increase in 1955 to 5,473 from 4,830 in 1953. The number then decreased for two consecutive years
after which it has steadily increased, probably due to economic growth in Canada. Id.
144. The requirement that an applicant's intent be "bona fide," the grant of an extension based
only on "good cause," and the strengthened "use in commerce" definition cumulatively prevent
abuse of the system. S. REP. No. 515, supra note 10, at 24-25, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMiN. NEws at 5586.
145. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text. For examples of judicial application of prin-
ciples of equity in concurrent registration cases, see Wiener King, Inc. v. The Wiener King Corp.,
615 F.2d 512, (CCPA 1980) (registration limited to the geographic area of actual use when first user
failed to apply for registration before a subsequent user adopted the mark; subsequent user entitled
to use mark nationwide except in area reserved to first user because second user was first to apply for
registration); Burger King of Florida, Inc. v. Hoots, 403 F.2d 904 (7th Cir. 1968) (federal registra-
tion gives nationwide protection except in the geographic area in which another party used the mark
without knowledge of prior user and before prior user sought registration); Dawn Donut Co. v.
Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959) (second user without actual knowledge of prior
user may continue use of a mark in a limited market until prior user and registrant expands into that
market).
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dently adopt a liberal approach when interpreting the "bona fide intent"
language of the 1988 Act. Primary responsibility for preventing hoard-
ing, however, rests with the PTO.
A. Interpreting the "'Bona Fide Intent" Language
Congress intended the PTO or the courts to measure an applicant's
bona fide intent to use a mark objectively, taking into account the cir-
cumstances showing the applicant's good-faith. '46 While requiring an
applicant's firm intent to use a particular mark, Congress recognized that
an applicant's final decision to use a mark may be affected by numerous
considerations. 147 In order to avoid frustrating congressional attempts to
recognize modem market realities, courts and the TTAB should infer
broadly the requisite bona fide intent from the surrounding
circumstances.
Congress went no further in defining a "bona fide intent" to use, pre-
ferring to leave the task to the PTO and the courts. 148 Courts and the
PTO are not completely bereft of guidelines in making this determina-
tion. Under the token use doctrine, the courts developed a body of case
law concerning a bona fide intent to make continued commercial use of a
mark. These cases offer guidelines in defining a "bona fide intent" to use
a mark under the new intent-to-use prong.
Generally, courts allowed registration on the basis of token use to
stand if efforts indicating an intent to make further commercial use of the
mark followed the initial use.149 Test marketing, advertising surveys,150
packaging preparations," 1 and other marketing preparations have been
146. The House added the "good faith" gloss to "bona fide intent" in order to emphasize con-
gressional desire that an applicant's intent in fact be bona fide. 134 CONG. REc. H10,419 (daily ed.
Oct. 19, 1988).
147. Congress specifically stated an applicant could still have a bona fide intent to use a mark
while awaiting the results of market research or product testing. S. REP. No. 515, supra note 10, at
24, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5587. Thus, an applicant could file
more than one intent-to-use application covering the same goods and still have the requisite intent.
Id.
148. Id., reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 5586-87.
149. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
150. Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 390 F.2d 1015, 1017 (CCPA 1968)
(Eighteen month hiatus in sales while applicant conducted marketing and advertising tests did not
defeat applicant's initial use).
151. Bertolli USA Inc. v. Filippo Bertolli Fine Foods Ltd., 662 F. Supp. 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(sending one bottle of olive oil in interstate commerce and printing labels and cartons found suffi-
cient to meet "use in commerce" test).
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accepted as evidence of a firm intent to use a mark under the old token
use system. The firmness requirement did not, however, apply with
equal weight to the product intended for use with the proposed mark.152
Thus, the fact that final development of a product was contingent upon
some other event was not controlling.153
Under the new system, the evaluation should focus on the actual ef-
forts of the applicant to bring the marked product to market and not on
the likelihood that intervening factors may frustrate the process. Simi-
larly, the length of time between such efforts should not be controlling as
long as they fall within the statutory time grant.154
Congress made it clear that the subjective intent of an applicant is not
controlling in the determination. 155 An applicant's bona fide intent must
be firm as evidenced by objective factors.' 5 6 A total lack of effort to put
the mark into use within the given time frame or sham efforts to do so
certainly constitute a lack of intent to use.' 7 Short of this, an evaluator
152. Sodima v. International Yogurt Co., 662 F. Supp. 839, 851 (D. Or. 1987) (citing Fast
Chemical Products Corp. v. Pillsbury Co., 132 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 561 (TrAB 1962) (a mere change of
formula or primary use does not destroy a trademark)). But see Sodima, 662 F. Supp. at 852 (appli-
cant must intend to use a mark with an identified product, not simply a "vague concept"). See also
Laboratories du Dr. R.G. Payot Etablissement v. Southwestern Classics Collection Ltd., 3 U.S.P.Q.
2d (BNA) 1601, 1605 (TTAB 1987) (product intended for use with a mark must exist at time of
application). One commentator recently outlined the specificity required by the "bona fide intent"
language. A business with a specific product in mind, even though that product has not been formu-
lated in final form and no production facilities exist, contemplates that use will occur at a foreseeable
point in the future and his intent is, therefore, bona fide. J. GILSON, Highlights of the Trademark
Law Revision Act of 1988, in 3 TRADEMARK PROTECION AND PRACTICE Comm-I (Spec. Supp.
1988).
153. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
154. Under the token use doctrine, the ITAB and the courts held that length of time between
uses was not itself controlling. Fort Howard Paper Co., 390 F.2d at 1017.
155. S. REP. No. 515, supra note 10, at 24, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMiN.
NEWS at 5587 ("bona fide intent should be read to mean a fair, objective determination of the appli-
cant's intent based on all the circumstances") (emphasis added).
156. One commentator proposes that Congress intended the "good faith circumstances" embel-
lishment to the bona fide intent requirement to pertain to the evidence supporting such intent.
Leeds, Intent-to-Use-Its Time Has Come, 79 TRADEMARK REP. 269, 272-73 (1989). Thus, in mak-
ing a determination as to whether an applicant filing multiple applications for the same product has a
bona fide intent, the prosecution of the application is crucial. If the applicant withdraws or aban-
dons an application when it becomes evident that the company will not be using that particular
mark, this "circumstance" supports the applicant's bona fide intent. Id. On the other hand, if the
applicant fails to remove the pending application for a discarded mark, this circumstance tends to
show the applicant merely intends to reserve the mark. Id.
157. Congress enumerated several factors which might negate an applicant's bona fide intent to
use a mark: filing numerous applications to register the same mark for many more new products
than are contemplated; numerous applications for a variety of desirable trademarks intended to be
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should view the applicant's efforts broadly.
While a liberal approach to the "bona fide intent" language is appro-
priate, courts should take a more cautious approach to the new "use"
definition. Liberal judicial interpretation of the "use" requirement gave
rise to the contrived practice of token use, which allowed applicants to
reserve marks they never used. 158 On the other hand, Congress urged
the courts and the TTAB to interpret the "use" definition flexibly in or-
der to encompass less traditional, albeit genuine, uses and to accommo-
date interrupted use due to special circumstances. 159  Accordingly, the
adjudicating bodies responsible for interpreting the "use" definition
should recognize the unique nature of a particular industry, but should
preclude any use made merely to reserve a mark. 1" This flexible inter-
pretation to the amended "use in commerce" definition in combination
with a liberal approach to "bona fide intent" should eliminate token use
and modernize trademark registration.
B. The Gatekeeper Role of the PTO in the Prevention of Abuse
Congress authorized the PTO to administer the trademark laws and
serve as the caretaker of the registration system.16 1 In this capacity, the
PTO is in an excellent position to prevent hoarding at three junctures of
the registration system. First, the PTO can screen applications aggres-
sively to eliminate those which fail to meet the statutory standards of
used on a single product; numerous applications to register marks consisting of or incorporating
descriptive terms relating to a contemplated new product; numerous applications to replace applica-
tions which lapsed because no timely declaration of use was filed; an excessive number of intent-to-
use applications to register marks which were never used; an excessive number of applications in
relation to the number of products the applicant is likely to introduce; or applications lacking in
specificity in describing the proposed goods. S. REP. No. 515, supra note 10, at 23-24, reprinted in
1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 5586. Similarly, one commentator stated that when the
applicant has no specific product in mind, but files a substantial number of trademark applications,
the implication is that the applicant is attempting to frustrate competition and bona fide intent is
lacking. J. GiIsoN, supra note 152, at Comm-ll. See also supra note 155 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
159. S. PEP. No. 515, supra note 10, at 46-47, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws at 5607. Congress made specific reference to infrequent sales of large or expensive items,
ongoing shipments of a new drug to clinical investigators awaiting federal approval, and sales made
in test markets. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
161. 15 U.S.C. § 1123 (1988): "The Commissioner shall make rules and regulations, not incon-
sistent with law, for the conduct of proceedings in the Patent and Trademark Office under this
chapter."
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section 2 of the Lanham Act. 162 Additionally, the PTO can apply pro-
gressively stricter standards of "good cause" for nonuse upon repeated
requests for extensions. Finally, the PTO can require all applicants to
include documentation of their trademark development strategies with
their applications.
1. Section 2(e) Examinations
When an applicant submits a registration application, 163 and again
when the applicant submits a statement of use,164 an examining attorney
makes a determination as to the proposed mark's registrability. The ex-
aminer may reject the application if problems appear imminent. 165 One
of the objectives of these inquiries is to ascertain whether the mark satis-
fies the requirements of section 2 of the Lanham Act.
The Lanham Act allows registration of fanciful, arbitrary, or sugges-
tive marks, 166 assuming that other statutory standards are met. On the
other hand, section 2(e) prohibits registration of marks which are merely
descriptive, deceptively misdescriptive, primarily geographically descrip-
tive or misdescriptive, or primarily merely a surname, 67 unless the appli-
cant can show that such marks have acquired distinctiveness in the eyes
162. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1988).
163. See supra notes 102-103 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 107-108 and accompanying text.
165. 37 C.F.R. § 2.61(a) (1989).
166. A fanciful trademark is one created expressly to identify a particular product or service. C.
MCMANIS, UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES IN A NUTSHELL, 125 (2d ed. 1988). For example, the word
"Thermos" used to describe a vacuum-insulated bottle was "fanciful" before it lost distinctiveness in
the eyes of the public. See King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Industries, Inc. 321 F.2d 577 (2d
Cir. 1963). Arbitrary marks are common words applied to new products with no apparent relation
between the name and the nature of the goods. C. McMANis, supra, at 126. An example of an
arbitrary mark would be the words "Just-Right" used to identify bird-feeders. Suggestive marks
allude to the characteristics of a product only through the powers of suggestion. Such marks require
imagination or thought before the public can ascertain the product's nature. Id. at 128.
"Skinvisible" as used to describe transparent adhesive tape is a suggestive mark. Minnesota Mining
& Manufacturing Co. v. Johnson & Johnson, 454 F.2d 1179 (C.C.P.A. 1972). By negative implica-
tion, merely descriptive marks require no imagination or thought, rather the nature of the product is
readily apparent from the name itself. See C. McMANIs, supra, at 128.
167. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(c) (1988). The Lanham Act does not expressly state what marks are
inherently registerable, only that certain marks are not registerable. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a)-(e) (1988).
The common law courts drew the distinction between distinctive marks and those which are merely
descriptive. C. McMANIs, supra note 166, at 106-07. The Supreme Court retained this distinction
for purposes of federal registration. Standard Paint Co. v. Trinidad Asphalt Mfg. Co., 220 U.S. 446
(1911).
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of the relevant public. 161 Marks acquire distinctiveness through use.
1 69
Accordingly, the PTO can prevent the hoarding of trademarks by aggres-
sively policing initial applications and denying registration to marks
which fail to meet the "distinctiveness" requirement of section 2.170
2. The "Good Cause" Guidelines
In order to obtain extensions after the one year allowance, an applicant
must again allege a bona fide intent to use the mark as well as show good
cause for nonuse.171 The House Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties
and the Administration of Justice added the "good cause" language out
of particular concern for potential hoarding.1 72 The Subcommittee, rec-
ognizing that automatic extensions may prevent another's legitimate use
of a mark, concluded that the PTO should grant extensions only upon a
showing of "exceptional circumstances."' 17 3
The PTO, heeding congressional concerns, promulgated guidelines for
acceptable instances of nonuse.174 In order to show good cause under
these guidelines, an applicant must make an allegation of nonuse175 and
include a statement of any ongoing effort to put the mark in use. 176 De-
168. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1988). Because fanciful, arbitrary, and suggestive marks do not re-
quire proof of distinctiveness, they are considered stronger marks and less susceptible to attack. See
C. McMAmis, supra note 166, at 127. Applicants seeking registration of marks of the "merely de-
scriptive" genre may properly do so only under the "use" prong of the 1988 Act, while applicants
with marks of the "fanciful" variety may be registered under either prong.
169. Id. The statute allows the Commissioner to accept proof of "substantially exclusive and
continuous use" of the mark in commerce for five years as prima facie evidence that the mark has
become distinctive.
170. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1988). In addition to preventing hoarding, aggressive screening by the
PTO might have the incidental effect of reducing later trademark challenges, because applicants may
choose fanciful, arbitrary or suggestive marks in order to reap the benefits of the intent-to-use prong
of the registration system. Because of the plethora of words and symbols from which to choose a
trademark and the endless possibilities for coining new words, aggressive screening by the PTO will
not preclude applicants from registering suitable marks.
171. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(d)(2) (1988).
172. H.R. REP. No. 1028, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1988). ("Substantially automatic and
lengthy extensions are inappropriate given that any extension will further tie up the mark and pre-
vent anyone else from using it.").
173. Id. ("[Tihe Committee intends that the Patent and Trademark Office take these situations
into account when determining whether to grant the applicant's extension request." The Committee
particularly mentioned delays "not attributable to the applicant.")
174. 54 Fed. Reg. 37,596 (1989) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 2.89(d)(2)).
175. Id. (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 2.89(d)(1)).
176. Id (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 2.89(d)(2)). The PTO set forth a nonexhaustive list of
qualifying efforts, all of which focus on the applicant's efforts: product or service research or devel-
opment, market research, manufacturing activities, promotional activities, steps to acquire distribu-
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lays beyond the applicant's control are contemplated as "exceptional cir-
cumstances" giving rise to an extension.177 The PTO, therefore, requires
nothing more than a statement of continuing efforts and does not require
any additional documentation. Thus, an applicant could hoard a trade-
mark upon a mere allegation of continued market research or a perfunc-
tory explanation for the lack of efforts.
The PTO could play a critical role in preventing hoarding by adopting
progressively stricter standards for repeated extension requests. 178 The
1988 Act gives applicants an automatic six month extension upon re-
quest. The PTO could maintain flexibility in the registration process by
promulgating flexible but somewhat stricter standards for the next two
extension requests. 179 The standards at this juncture should make al-
lowances for instances of nonuse even if within the control of the appli-
cant. Barring special circumstances, two years should be ample time for
an applicant to put a mark to use. 18  Thereafter, the PTO's guidelines
should be strict and only allow extensions upon a showing of exceptional
circumstances not attributable to the applicant.181 This approach would
effectuate Congress' intent to prevent abuse of the available extensions
while maintaining flexibility for applicants who are truly experiencing
hardships.
3. Documentation Requirements
Finally, the PTO should require all applicants to submit documenta-
tion of their trademark development strategies with their applications.
tors, steps to obtain required governmental approval, or other similar activities. Id. If the applicant
has not made such efforts, the guidelines allow submission of a satisfactory explanation for failure to
do so. Id.
177. H.R. REP. No. 1028, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1988). As an example, the House referred
to the inability of a pharmaceutical company to use a mark with a particular drug due to delays in
the federal approval process. The Report then goes on to note that these delays are "unattributable
to the applicant" and are the kind of "exceptional circumstances" contemplated by the House. Id.
178. See Hellwig, The Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988: The 100th Congress Leaves its
Mark, 79 TRADEMARK REP. 287, 296-297 (1989) [hereinafter TLRA of1988] (progressively stricter
standards for repeated extension requests address the problem of excessive time periods for pending
applications while maintaining flexibility).
179. Id.
180. Given the fact that the average trademark application takes approximately thirteen months
to achieve registration, extensions amounting to two years actually give the applicant three years to
put a mark into use. Id. at 296. Three years certainly give an applicant enough time to make use of
a mark. J. GILSON, supra note 152, at Comm-10 (even a "fairly leisurely marketing program"
should be able to meet the three-year requirement).
181. TLRA of 1988, supra note 178, at 297.
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With respect to the use-based applications, additional documentation
may help to ascertain whether the "use" alleged actually meets the
stricter standards of the new "use in commerce" definition. 18 2 Similarly,
inclusion of a record of development strategies with intent-to-use applica-
tions serves to substantiate claims of special circumstances,' as well as
bolster bona fide intent claims.'" The documentation requirement
would prevent applicants from making specious claims and would facili-
tate PTO determinations concerning "use," "bona fide intent" and "good
cause."
V. CONCLUSION
The 1988 Act represents two years of exhaustive study by the USTA
and careful consideration by Congress in an effort to rectify the hard-
ships rendered by the Lanham Act and to modernize trademark registra-
tion requirements. Liberal construction of the Act's provisions will
effectuate its purposes. While the potential for hoarding exists under
broad interpretation, it is not fatal to the Act's effectiveness.
The PTO should assume primary responsibility for preventing abuse of
the intent-to-use system. The PTO can screen the number of marks
which have access to the Principal Register by denying intent-to-use re-
gistration of nondistinctive marks. Furthermore, the PTO should set
and enforce exacting standards for repeated requests for extensions based
on "good cause" for nonuse. Finally, the PTO should require all appli-
cants to document trademark development strategies in order to substan-
tiate claims of "use in commerce," "bona fide intent," and "exceptional
circumstances" when seeking extensions. A firm stance on the part of
the PTO would minimize hoarding and allow the courts to pursue a lib-
eral approach to the 1988 Act's provisions. The PTO, the TTAB, and
the federal courts must proceed accordingly if they are to protect future
trademark registrants.
Tammy J. Snyder
182. See supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text. The documentation requirement would
help the PTO in ascertaining whether the particular use in question is one of the unique uses which
Congress contemplated when urging flexibility in applying the standard.
183. See supra notes 175-77 and accompanying text.
184. One commentator maintains that prudent applicants should document the progress of their
marks as a matter of course to provide evidence in later challenges. J. GILsoN, supra note 152, at
Comm-7. Thus, requiring such documentation could lead to greater certainty in other controversies.
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